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ABSTRACT
We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether,
alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find
that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause
growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the
instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a
variety of additional evidence, suggest that a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than
are the institutions, b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by
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  Today, both the U.S. and the international community face two major development 
challenges around the world, from Iraq, to Haiti, to sub-Saharan Africa: how to ignite growth and 
how to establish democracy.   Economic research has identified two broad approaches to 
confronting these challenges.   The first approach emphasizes the need to start with democracy 
and other checks on government as the mechanisms for securing property rights.   With such 
political institutions in place, investment in human and physical capital, and therefore economic 
growth, are expected to follow.   The second approach emphasizes the need for human and 
physical capital accumulation to start the process.  It holds that even pro-market dictators can 
secure property rights as a matter of policy choice, not of political constraints.   From the vantage 
point of poor countries, it sees democracy and other institutional improvements as the 
consequences of increased education and wealth, not as their causes.   
  Both approaches to development have extensive intellectual pedigree.  The importance of 
constraining government was stressed by Montesquieu (1748) and Smith (1776), as well by the 
new institutional economics literature (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, North and Thomas 1973, 
North 1981, 1990).   DeLong and Shleifer (1993) supplied early empirical support for this view 
using data on urbanization of European regions during the last millennium, which showed faster 
city growth under more limited governments.   More recently, the literature on economic growth, 
starting with early contributions by Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995), has turned to the 
effects of good institutions on economic growth.   It is fair to say that recent work, including Hall 
and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002), Easterly and Levine (2003), 
Dollar and Kraay (2003), and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002), has reached close to an 
intellectual consensus that the political institutions of limited government cause economic growth.     3
  The reverse idea, namely that growth in income and human capital causes institutional 
improvement, is most closely associated with the work of Seymour Martin Lipset (1960), who 
however himself gives credit to Aristotle.  Lipset believed that educated people are more likely to 
resolve their differences through negotiation and voting than through violent disputes.  Education 
is needed for courts to operate and to empower citizens to engage with government institutions.  
Literacy encourages the spread of knowledge about the government’s malfeasance.  According to 
this view, countries differ in their stocks of human and social capital – which can be acquired 
through policies pursued even by dictators – and institutional outcomes depend to a large extent 
on these endowments (see Djankov et al. 2003).  This line of work seems to accord well with the 
experiences of South Korea, Taiwan, and China, which grew rapidly under one-party 
dictatorships, the first two eventually turning to democracy.  Empirically, Lipset’s hypothesis – 
that growth leads to better political institutions -- has received considerable support in the work of 
Przeworski and his associates (Alvarez et al. 2000) and Barro (1999).   
  The two views of economic and political development share some important similarities.  
They both emphasize the need for secure property rights to support investment in human and 
physical capital, and they both see such security as a public policy choice.  However, the 
institutional view sees the pro-investment policies as a consequence of  political constraints on 
government, whereas the development view sees these policies in poor countries largely as 
choices of their – typically unconstrained -- leaders.   
  In this paper, we revisit these two broad approaches to development in an effort to assess 
each one’s empirical validity.   Our view is shaped to some extent by the experiences of North and 
South Korea, illustrated in Figure 1.   Prior to the Korean war, the two countries were obviously 
part of one, so it is difficult to think of them as having different histories.  They were both   4
exceptionally poor in 1950.  Between the end of the Korean war and 1980, both countries were 
dictatorships.   If institutions are measured by Polity’s “constraints on the executive,” which as we 
discuss below is probably the best of the measures commonly used in the literature, then between 
1950 and 1980 North Korea had an average score of 1.71, and South Korea 2.16 (out of 7).  Yet 
South Korean dictators chose capitalism and secure property rights and the country grew rapidly, 
reaching per capita income level of  US $1589 in 1980.  The North Korean dictator, in contrast, 
chose socialism, and the country only reached the level of income of US $768 in 1980.   Figure 1 
also shows that, starting in 1980, South Korea transforms itself into a democracy, while North 
Korea remains a dictatorship.   While on average, looking over the half century between 1950 and 
2000, South Korea obviously had better institutions as measured by constraints on the executive, 
these institutions are the outcome of economic growth after 1950 rather than its cause.  It would 
be wrong to attribute South Korea’s growth to these institutions rather than the choices made by 
its dictators.  
  Our empirical analysis proceeds in five stages.  In section II, we revisit three measures of 
“institutions” used in the current economic growth literature: risk of expropriation by the 
government, government effectiveness, and constraints on the executive.   We show that the first 
two of these measures by construction do not describe political institutions: they are outcome 
measures that reflect the government’s past restraint from expropriation in the first case, and its 
quality in the second.  These measures do not code dictators who choose to respect property rights 
any differently than democratically elected leaders who have no choice but to respect them.  Since 
these measures confound constraints on government with dictatorial choices, they do not proxy for 
institutions, which in their essence are constraints (North 1981).  Moreover, these are both   5
subjective measures which rise sharply with the level of economic development, raising severe 
doubts that the causality runs from them to growth rather than the other way around.   
The third measure we consider, constraints on the executive, is in principle linked to 
constraints on government, but in reality is constructed to reflect the outcomes of most recent 
elections.  In developing countries, even this measure is extremely volatile, and cannot be 
plausibly interpreted as reflecting durable rules, procedures or norms that the term “institutions” 
refers to.  Indeed, we show that the three conventional measures of institutions are uncorrelated 
with constitutional constraints on government that scholars have just begun to use.  All this 
evidence sheds doubt on the proposition that the measures of institutions used in the growth 
literature reflect any “deep” parameters that they are purported to measure.   
  In Section III, we discuss some of the basic OLS evidence on the relationship between 
institutions, human capital, and economic growth.   We confirm the now well-established 
propositions that the initial level of human capital of a country, and the average level of its 
institutions over a period of time, predict its level of economic growth over that very same period 
of time.  But, as section II shows, and the South Korean example illustrates, institutional quality 
rises as a country grows richer.   In fact, we find that, in a variety of specifications, initial levels of 
constraints on the executive do not predict subsequent economic growth, whereas initial levels of 
human capital continue to be strong predictors.  Thus even the OLS evidence is quite unsupportive 
of  the proposition that constraints on the executive cause growth, and is supportive of the 
proposition that the more basic cause is human capital.    
  In section IV, we try to dig deeper into these issues by looking at the universe of poor 
countries as of 1960.  We find that virtually all of these countries had uneducated populations, and 
were moreover run by dictators.  Indeed, most countries in this group have spent the vast majority   6
of years since 1960 under dictators.  These dictatorships had a large dispersion of growth rates, an 
observation itself inconsistent with the view that constraints on government shape growth 
experiences of poor countries.   The near universality of dictatorships in poor countries suggests 
that the security of property in these countries is the result of  policy choices, not constraints.  
  In Section V, we turn to one of the central strategies that researchers have used to establish 
the primacy of political institutions: instrumental variables.   We discuss recent work of  
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002), which shows that, among European colonies, 
settler mortality and population density in 1500 predict institutional quality and the level of 
economic development today.   We show, however, that these results do not establish a role for  
institutions.  Specifically, the Europeans who settled in the New World may have brought with 
them not so much their institutions, but themselves, i.e., their human capital.  This theoretical 
ambiguity is consistent with the empirical evidence as well.  We show that the instruments used in 
the literature for institutions are even more highly correlated with human capital both today and in 
1900, and that, in instrumental variable specifications predicting economic growth, human capital 
performs better than institutions.   At the purely econometric level, this evidence suggests that 
predictors of settlement patterns are not valid instruments for institutions.   
  In Section VI, we conclude the empirical analysis by looking at the timing of human 
capital accumulation and institutional quality.   We find evidence consistent with the example of 
South Korea, namely that economic growth and human capital accumulation cause institutional 
improvement, rather than the other way around.   
  Finally, Section VII concludes with some implications of our analysis.  We find ourselves 
much closer to Lipset than to the new institutionalists.    If the experience of poor countries in the 
last 50 years is a guide, politically constrained government may not be a viable strategy for them   7
to secure property rights.   Rather, these countries may need to emphasize economic policies and 
choices that ensure such security, even by dictators.   Growth in these countries may be feasible 
without immediate institutional improvement, and is likely in turn to lead to institutional 
improvement.   At least this is what the data show.  
 
II.  The Measurement of Institutions.  
North (1981) defines institutions as “a set of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and 
ethical behavioral norms designed to constrain the behavior of individuals in the interests of 
maximizing the wealth or utility of principals” (p. 201-202).    A key word that this and other 
definitions share is constraints.   Thus constitutions or electoral rules are good examples of 
institutions, but good policies chosen by dictators who have a free hand are not.   But there is 
another essential aspect of institutions noted even in dictionaries: the constraints need to be 
reasonably permanent or durable.  Indeed, transitory “constraints” would not necessarily bind, and 
may be changed by those who do not like them.  This permanency or “depth” of institutions has 
been relied on, for example, to justify using history as an instrument for institutional quality today 
(Rodrik et al. 2002).   Thus legal systems or electoral rules look more like “institutions” when they 
are actually used over time, in contrast, for example, to the presidencies of Bill Clinton or George 
Bush, which most people would not regard as “institutions.”   
In this section, we discuss the measurement of political institutions used in recent research. 
We ask if these measures of institutions reflect a) constraints on government and b) permanent or at 
least durable features of the environment.     We show that, in fact, they reflect neither.  
To measure institutions, the literature has focused on several sets of variables.    Here we 
discuss three.   The first set, used initially by Knack and Keefer (1995) and Hall and Jones (1999),   8
and more recently by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), are survey indicators of 
institutional quality from the International Country Risk Guide, collected over the 1980s and 1990s.   
The second set, used most recently by Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002), is an aggregated 
index of mostly survey assessments of government effectiveness collected by Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi (2003).   The third set, coming from the Polity IV data set collected by political 
scientists (Jaggers and Marshall 2000), aims directly to measure the limits of executive power.   
  Below we discuss these measures of institutions.  We make three distinct points.  First, all 
three data sets measure outcomes, not some permanent characteristics that North refers to.  As such, 
all these measures 1) rise with per capita income, and 2) are highly volatile.  Both of these facts are 
inconsistent with the view that they measure permanent or even durable features of the political 
environment.   Second, the first two sets of measures of institutions are constructed so that dictators 
freely choosing good policies receive as high evaluations as governments constrained to choose 
them.  An examination of these variables shows, for example,  that dictators who chose to respect 
property rights – in the U.S.S.R. or Singapore, for example -- received high scores, which the 
literature has interpreted as having “good institutions.”   Even if these measures are extremely useful 
indicators of policy choices, they are by their very construction not constraints, and therefore 
unusable for discussions of how specific constraints on government that would guarantee the 
security of property rights.   The Polity IV variables are intended to focus on political constraints, 
but we show that they too reflect political outcomes rather than durable constraints.    
  Third, these measures of political institutions appear to be uncorrelated with the available 
constitutional measures of constraints on government coming from either electoral rules or courts.  It 
is possible that these constitutional measures are noisy, and it is certain that “rules on the books” are 
very different from what actually takes place in a country.  But this is precisely the point: the   9
institutional outcomes that scholars have used as measures of constraints have very little to do with 
the constitutional constraints, raising doubts about the effectiveness of changing political rules.   
Begin with the data from ICRG.   The data include subjective assessments of risk for 
international investors along such dimensions as law and order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, 
risk of expropriation by the government, and risk of government contract repudiation.  Of all three 
data sets, this one is probably the most problematic.  It is plain that these measures reflect what 
actually happened in a country rather than some permanent rules of the game.   For example, in 
1984, the top ten countries with the lowest expropriation risk include Singapore and the U.S.S.R..  
In these cases, the data obviously reflect the choices of dictators and not political constraints.  
Along similar lines, the data show a bizarre reduction in the risk of expropriation over time.  
Between 1982 and 1997, Iran moves from the score of 1 (highest expropriation risk) to 9 (close to 
the top score of 10), Libya from 1.5 to 9, and Syria from 1.5 to 9.  We are not familiar with 
significant institutional constraints on the leaders of Iran, Libya, and Syria, although of course in 
the last few years these dictators had stayed away from expropriation and the data reflect their 
choices.  Indeed, consistent with the intellectual victory of the Washington Consensus, the data 
show that the average score on expropriation risk in the sample rises from 5 in 1982 to 9 (with the 
median of 9.5) in 1997. Whatever expropriation risk measures, it is obviously not permanent rules, 
procedures, or norms supplying checks and balances on the sovereign.  
  The Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Labaton (2002) “government effectiveness” variable is 
likewise a clear outcome measure.  Starting in 1996, these authors have aggregated a large number 
of subjective assessments of institutional quality into broad indices of government effectiveness.  
“In Government Effectiveness, we combine perceptions of the quality of public service provision, 
the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil   10
service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies 
into a single grouping” (p. 8).  These are clear ex-post outcomes, highly correlated with the level of 
economic development, rather than political constraints per se.  Indeed, the country that receives 
the highest score in the world is Singapore, a state known both for its one party rule and for this 
party’s chosen respect for private property. 
  Polity IV data make the greatest attempt at measuring the political environment rather than 
dictatorial choices.  Constraints on the executive refers to “the extent of institutionalized constraints 
on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities.”  The 
highest score for this variable is 7, the lowest is 1.  The rich democracies, but also countries like 
Botswana, India, and South Africa, tend to get the perfect score of 7.  Dictatorships like Cuba, Iraq, 
North Korea, but also Pinochet’s Chile get the worst score of 1, the communist countries such as 
China and U.S.S.R. are in the middle with 3’s.  It is difficult to see how property is more secure in 
Mao’s China than in Pinochet’s Chile, but at least it is clear what the variable is trying to get at.   
The concern of this variable is, according to its creators, with the checks and balances 
between the various parties in the decision making process.   However, a closer look at how this 
variable is constructed immediately reveals that it is an outcome measure, which reflects not the 
constraints, but what happened in the last election.  When countries have inconsistent electoral 
experiences, their scores fluctuate wildly.  For example, Haiti gets the worst score of 1 under the 
dictatorship during 1960-1989, jumps up to 6 when Aristide is elected in 1990, goes back to 1 when 
he is ousted during 1991-1993, rises again to 6 and even a perfect score of 7 during 1994-1998 as 
Aristide and his party return to power (even though the elections had been widely criticized), but 
falls down all the way to 3 during 2000-2001.   Likewise, Argentina fluctuates between the worst 
scores under generals, and the best ones after elections, even when the elected leaders undermine   11
the legislature and courts.  The data make it obvious that Polity IV provides a rapidly moving 
assessment of electoral outcomes over time, not a measure of actual political constraints on 
government, and certainly not a measure of anything permanent or durable.  And to the extent that, 
in richer countries, elections are likely to be cleaner, “constraints on the executive” may well be a 
consequence of development rather than the other way around.   
  Likewise, the measure of “democracy” in Polity IV reflects the extent to which “the three 
essential, interdependent elements” are actually adhered to.   These include “the presence of 
institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preference about 
alternative policies and leaders, the existence of institutional constraints of the exercise of power by 
the executive (see above), and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and 
in acts of political participation.”  Although the definition is intended to suggest some permanence, 
the construction of the variable, like that of the previous measure, reflects most recent experiences.
  In Tables 1 and 2, we illustrate the “outcome” nature of even the Polity IV measures.   
Table 1 shows the average within-country deviations of five variables: autocracy (from Alvarez et 
al. 2000, based on Polity), constraints on the executive from Polity, democracy from Polity, 
autocracy from Polity, and, for comparison, Barro’s measure of years of schooling.   Due to data 
availability, all variables are measured every five years, between 1960 and 2000.  All individual 
year observations are normalized to lie between zero and 1 to make comparison easier.  Table 1 
shows that even the Polity variables are twice as volatile as the measure of human capital.   If  
constancy is a measure of depth, then human capital is “deeper” than institutions.     
  Table 2 looks at persistence of human capital and politics by regressing 2000 values of the 
political variables on their 1960 values.  We find that education is much more persistent than the 
measures of constraints on the executive from Polity.  The amount of mean reversion in political   12
institutions is stunning, suggesting that these variables can hardly be used as assessments of “deep” 
or “permanent” features of the political landscape.     
  The fact that the measures of institutions used in the literature reflect choices (often made 
by dictators) rather than constraints is further illustrated by examining the correlations between 
these variables and written constitutional rules.  We consider four such measures. The first two are 
motivated by the work of Persson and Tabellini (2003) on electoral rules, which these authors see 
as one of the important constraints on executive authority.  One such variable we use is “plurality”, 
which equals one if legislators are elected using a winner-take-all/first past the post rule. The other 
objective measure is “proportional representation,” which equals one if candidates to the upper and 
lower houses of parliament are elected using a proportional representation system. Both of these 
variables come from Beck et al. (2001).  In addition, we use two constitutional measures of the 
checks on the executive supplied by the judiciary from La Porta et al. (2004).  The first is judicial 
independence, which measures the permanency in office of supreme court judges. The second is 
constitutional review, which measures the extent of judicial review of legislation.  Again, all these 
are constitutional measures of political rules constraining the executive.  
  Table 3 presents the correlations between the outcome measures used in the growth and 
institutions literature, per capita income in 2000, and objective institutional rules.  For the 
traditional institutional measures, we follow the growth literature and use the averages computed 
over different time periods.  Thus we use the 1960-2000 average for executive constraints, 1982 -
1997 average for expropriation risk, 1960-1990 average for the Alvarez et al. (2000) measure of 
autocracy,  and the average of 1996, 1998, and 2000 values for government effectiveness.  Judicial 
independence and constitutional review are available at only one point in time (in 1995), while 
plurality and proportional representation are averages over the period 1975-2000.      13
Three results stand out.  First, the traditional indices of institutional quality are strongly 
correlated with each other, as well as with per capita income.  This result is consistent with 
institutions having a causal positive effect on growth, but also with reverse causality.   Specifically, 
if institutional outcomes improve as a country grows richer, as they clearly do, then both the 
average and the end of period institutional assessments will be higher in richer countries.  Second, 
plurality and proportional representation – both constitutional measures of constraints – are 
correlated with per capita income (as well as with the subjective measures), but the correlations are 
much smaller than those of the traditional indices. Third, the measures of judicial checks and 
balances – judicial independence and constitutional review – are uncorrelated with per capita 
income, and only judicial independence is weakly correlated with outcome indices.  The weak 
correlations may mean either that these constitutional measures of constraints are noisy, or that the 
association between “institutions” and development comes from institutional outcomes being better 
in richer countries, rather than political rules creating wealth. 
  The bottom line of this section is that the commonly used measures of institutions cannot be 
used to establish causality.  These measures are not constructed to reflect either constraints on 
government or permanent features of the political landscape.   Instead, they are highly volatile and 
mean-reverting.  They are barely correlated with the available objective measures of constitutional 
constraints on government.  Yet these are the variables used to show that institutions cause growth. 
 
III.  Political Institutions, Human Capital, and Economic Growth.   
  Table 4 presents the standard OLS growth regressions using the various measures of 
political institutions we discussed above.   As in the correlation Table 3, we follow the literature 
and use averages of the assessments of institutional quality over a period of time.  In Table 4, the   14
dependent variable is the growth of per capita income between 1960 and 2000, and the independent 
variables are initial income per capita (as suggested by Barro 1991), initial education,  the share of 
a country’s population in temperate zones, as well as eight institutional variables entering one at a 
time.  The results confirm the now-standard observation of convergence, as well as the benign 
influence of  temperate weather.   
The results also show that the initial level of education is a strong predictor of subsequent 
economic growth.   One interpretation of this result would support theories of growth in which 
human capital generates significant technological externalities (e.g., Lucas 1988).  However, 
Pritchett (2000) summarizes evidence suggesting that economic returns to education in developing 
countries are not especially high.   An alternative interpretation is along the lines of Lipset (1960), 
namely human capital leads to more benign politics, less violence, and more political stability.  The 
key human capital externality is not technological but political: courts and legislatures replace guns.   
These improvements in turn bring about greater security of property and economic growth.   This 
interpretation is consistent with the evidence of Alesina et al. (1996) that political stability predicts 
economic growth, and with many findings we discuss below.   
Finally, the evidence shows a strong correlation between economic growth over a period 
and the average assessments of institutional quality over that period, including constraints on the 
executive, risk of expropriation, government effectiveness, and autocracy.    In contrast, there is no 
relationship between growth and constitutional measures of institutions, such as judicial 
independence, constitutional review, plurality, and proportional representation.  The contrast 
between the institutional outcome variables used in the growth literature, and the constitutional 
constraints on government, is striking.   15
  One reason that average assessments of institutions might enter significantly in the growth 
regressions is that these assessments improve as the economy gets richer, so the causality runs in 
reverse.  Note, in contrast, that growth regressions typically use initial values of education.  To 
further assess this possibility, Tables 5 and 6 present a series of growth regressions in which the 
independent variable is the executive constraints at the beginning of the period.  We focus on 
executive constraints because it is the only measure that is clearly not a consequence of dictatorial 
choices, and hence, even though it reflects electoral outcomes, can at least loosely be thought of as 
relating to constraints on government.   
  Table 5 presents, starting in 1960, decade by decade growth regressions using initial period 
education, initial period per capita income, and initial period constraints on the executive, as 
independent variables.  It also presents similar regressions for the whole period 1960-2000.  (We 
have also obtained, but do not report, very similar results using 20-year intervals.)   Table 5 shows  
that, even in the OLS specifications, initial executive constraints have no predictive power for 
subsequent economic growth outside the 1980s, whereas initial human capital is a strong predictor.  
These results exacerbate the concern over reverse causality when sample averages of institutional 
outcomes are used in growth specifications.   
Table 6 takes advantage of the fact that data on executive constraints are available for a few 
countries as far back as the middle of the 19
th century, as are data on economic growth from 
Maddison (2003).   We also have some data on primary school enrollments starting in 1870 from 
Lindert (2001).  For these small samples, we can regress long term growth on initial executive 
constraints,  initial income, and initial school enrollments.  Again, there is  no evidence that 
constraints on the executive predict growth, but some evidence that initial human capital does.       16
  The evidence presented in these tables on the relationship between institutions and growth 
leaves us skeptical about causality.   Nonetheless, an advocate of institutional view might argue that 
the average political outcome over time is a good measure of durable constraints.  If institutions 
reflect “deep” features of the environment, then even if constraints on the executive measure the 
cleanness of the last election, the average of such constraints over time is a good proxy for the 
“permanent” or “durable” constraints.  It is then the average rather than the starting points that 
belongs in the growth regression.  Moreover, human capital, being not as “deep” as the average of 
institutional outcomes, simply does not belong in the regression.    
  In light of the results we have brought out, this argument is not persuasive.  First, the fact 
that even the Polity measures of institutions are more volatile and more mean reverting than years 
of schooling raises severe doubts that these variables, even if averaged, reflect anything more 
permanent than human capital.  Second, this argument does not deal with the obvious point of 
reverse causality, and the fact that initial measures of political institutions, in just about any sample, 
seem to have no predictive power at all.   Indeed, even if we follow the recommendation that 
constraints on the executive must be averaged, but regress ten year growth rates on the average 
constraints of the executive over the previous decade, these averages do not predict subsequent 
economic growth.  The results are very similar to those in Table 5.  Averaging itself, without 
regressing growth on contemporaneous average institutional quality, does not suggest that 
institutions predict growth.  Third, the lack of correlation between even the average outcome 
measures and the constitutional constraints on government raises still further doubts that anything 
deep is being measured.   In sum, while there might be (though certainly does not need to be) 
something “deep” about institutions, it is implausible to argue that the variables used in the 
standard growth regressions capture anything “deep”.   17
  What do we learn from this analysis?  To us, the principal conclusion is that, at least in the 
OLS regressions, the evidence that institutions cause economic growth, as opposed to growth  
improving institutions, is non-existent. The objective measures of institutions, those that actually 
describe the constitutional rules that limit the power of the sovereign, have no predictive power for 
the growth of per capita income.  Even the beginning-of-period executive constraints have no 
predictive power.  In contrast, the political variables that are correlated with development are 
themselves by construction a product of development.  The OLS cross-country evidence for 1960-
2000 provides no support for the claim that  “institutions cause growth.”  
 
IV.  Politics and Growth in Poor Countries After 1960. 
   Growth regressions are one way to assess the effect of institutions on economic growth.  
Another way is to consider human capital and political institutions in the sample of poor countries 
circa 1960.  To this end, we divide our 1960 sample of countries into those with low human capital 
(total years of schooling per capita below the median value of 2.68), intermediate human capital 
(schooling between 2.68 and 5.01 years per capita), and high human capital (schooling above the 
75
th percentile value of 5.01 years per capita).  We independently divide this sample into four types 
of political regimes using the 1960-2000 average Polity IV democracy score: autocracies (countries 
with the average score under 2), stable democracies (countries with the average perfect score of 
10), and two intermediate groups: imperfect autocracies (the average score between 2 and 7) and 
imperfect democracies (the average score between 7 and 10).  Autocracies include places like Saudi 
Arabia, Vietnam, and Yemen.  Stable democracies cover all the usual developed countries (except 
that it includes Costa Rica but not France).     18
  Table 7 presents the number of observations in each of the 12 cells using the two 
independent classifications.  Nearly all highly educated countries are stable democracies (score = 
10), and nearly all stable democracies are highly educated. (The two stable democracies with 
intermediate human capital are Italy and Costa Rica.)  In contrast, nearly all dictatorships are 
poorly educated; the only dictatorships with the intermediate level of human capital are Paraguay, 
Singapore, and Taiwan.  Put differently, the lowest education countries are never stable 
democracies; the highest education countries are generally stable, but sometimes imperfect, 
democracies. Consistent with Lipset, over the last 40 years, politics has been much more benign in 
well-educated, than in poorly educated, countries.   
  Are these differences between educated and uneducated countries reflected in the growth 
rates as well?  Table 8 presents the data on average growth rates of different groups of countries. 
During 1960-2000, countries with high human capital in 1960 have grown 2 times faster, on 
average, than low human capital ones. Stable democracies have grown slightly faster than 
imperfect democracies, and much faster than dictatorships, on average, but this may of course be 
just the human capital effect.   In addition, Table 8 shows the dispersion of growth rates among 
different groups of countries.  It shows the higher dispersion of growth rates across autocracies than 
democracies, and across poorly educated countries relative to the well educated ones.  
  The evidence in Tables 7 and 8 leads to another reason for skepticism about the primacy of 
political constraints for economic development: although nearly all poor countries in 1960 were 
dictatorships, some of them have managed to get out of poverty, while others stayed poor.  This 
kind of evidence is at least suggestive that it is the choices made by the dictators, rather than the 
constraints on them, that have allowed some poor countries to emerge from poverty.  If being a 
stable democracy, with all the effective constitutional constraints on the executive, is not an option   19
for a poor country, and if dictatorship is the more likely political path, then it is crucial to 
understand what makes for a successful dictatorship. 
This suggestion receives a further boost from a simple characterization of who actually 
leads the less educated countries over time.  In Table 9, we continue to separate countries into those 
with low and moderate levels of human capital, as before.  We then classify for each year the 
country’s leader along two dimensions.  We follow the Alvarez et al. (2000) classification of 
leaders as being democratic or autocratic.  In addition, we group the leaders by the length of their 
tenure. The Table shows the amount of time spent by countries in our sample being led by 
democratic and autocratic leaders of different tenure lengths.   
The least educated countries are overwhelmingly led by long-standing dictators.  For 66 
percent of the years in our sample, these countries are led by autocratic leaders who eventually last 
for at least five years.  For 50 percent of the years in our sample, these countries are led by 
autocrats who eventually last for at least ten years.  In contrast, only 6 percent of the time are the 
least-educated countries led by democratic leaders with terms that end up being less than five years, 
and only 13 percent of the time, these countries are run by democratically elected leaders that last 
for more than five years.  Among moderately well educated countries, the situation is more mixed.   
About 43 percent of the time, these countries are governed by democratically elected leaders.  For 
32 percent of the time, they are governed by democratic leaders who last between 2 and 10 years in 
office.  In contrast, these countries are governed by dictators who last for more than 5 years for 44 
percent of the time in the sample.  Yet, the dictatorship that lasts for more than 10 years is still the 
largest single grouping in the table (32 percent).   
This evidence is at most suggestive.  But it does suggest that, from the point of view of 
understanding the emergence of countries from poverty, the focus on placing constraints on   20
government as a starting reform may have been misplaced.    The focus on factor accumulation, 
including the growth in human capital, might have been more productive.    
 
V. Instrumental Variables.  
From the beginning, the growth and institutions research recognized that growth may itself 
lead to better institutions.  One way in which this literature tried to address this problem is 
instrumental variables.   Mauro (1995) already recognizes these issues, and uses ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization of the population as an instrument for corruption.  Hall  and Jones (1999) use 
ICRG measures of institutional quality, but instrument them using “distance from the equator and 
the extent to which the primary languages of Western Europe are spoken today” (p. 110).   
Researchers also tried to take advantage of the fact that the European expansion influenced the 
countries being conquered and colonized.  La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999) take advantage of this 
colonial experiment by looking at legal transplantation. They argue that Europeans brought their 
legal systems into the countries they conquered or colonized, and that therefore legal origin can be 
used as an instrument for the structure of various laws.   
  This line of research was subsequently given a substantial boost by a pair of recent papers 
by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002).   These authors argue that central to 
understanding each country’s political institutions is not what laws the Europeans brought, but 
rather whether they themselves settled in the particular colonies.  AJR (2001) argue that the 
mortality of European settlers in the countries they colonized shaped their decision to settle or not.  
When the Europeans settled, they brought with them the effective European institutions 
constraining the executive, whereas when they did not settle, they instituted systems of arbitrary 
rule and expropriation of local populations.  AJR (2002) further argue that the density of non-  21
European populations in the prospective colonies shaped the European settlement patterns.   When 
a region was densely settled (or urbanized) by the locals, the Europeans did not settle themselves, 
but rather introduced exploitative institutions.  In low density areas, in contrast, they settled and 
brought their institutions of limited government, thereby causing long run growth.   Using this 
logic, AJR (2001, 2002) argue that both settler mortality and indigenous population density in 1500 
can be used as instruments for modern day political institutions constraining the executive.  
  The AJR papers invigorated the institutions and growth literature.   Below we discuss their 
work.  But, as a starting point, it is important to note that, even if one agrees that mortality risk or 
indigenous population density shaped the European settlement decisions, it is far from clear that 
what the Europeans brought with them when they settled is  limited government.  It seems at least 
as plausible that what they brought with them is themselves, and therefore their know-how and 
human capital.  (This is the interpretation of the effects of settler mortality suggested theoretically 
by Djankov et al. (2003)).  If that is the case, then at a purely conceptual level one cannot infer 
from the patterns of European settlement that the asset being transplanted is institutions.   To put 
the same point in econometric terms, valid instruments must be uncorrelated with the error term, 
and if settlement patterns influence growth through channels other than institutions, they are not 
valid instruments.  As we suggest below, this observation has significant implications for the 
interpretation of  instrumental variables regressions of growth on institutions. 
  The correlation between AJR’s proposed instruments and their preferred measures of 
institutions is very high indeed.  For example, the logarithm of settler mortality is correlated at -.54 
with average executive constraints, and -.51 with average expropriation risk, while the logarithm of 
population density in 1500s is correlated at -.35 and -.40 with the same measures of institutions.      22
  But are AJR’s proposed instruments valid?  We have several concerns, some already 
discussed in the literature, but some new and perhaps more important.  First,  settler mortality is 
basically uncorrelated with the constitutional measures of checks and balances we discussed in 
Section II, and the logarithm of 1500 population density is only very weakly correlated with 
plurality and proportional representation.  If the Europeans really brought their institutions 
constraining government, one might expect this influence to be reflected in “rules and procedures,” 
yet this does not appear to be the case in the data.   This is also surprising in light of all the 
available evidence that colonial transplantation of  legal traditions – the ultimate rules and 
compliance procedures -- has been central in shaping the legal and regulatory systems of the 
receiving countries.   Why would colonial influence on rules and procedures be so strong in one 
case, but not in the other?  
  Second, an important element of the AJR line of reasoning is that settler mortality reflects 
past settlement policies and their modern consequences.  Yet the instruments appear to be 
correlated with the modern disease environment as well.  Jeffrey Sachs and his associates (Gallup 
et al. 2001, Kiszewski et al. 2004) present data on modern malaria risk and malaria ecology.  The 
correlation of the log of settler mortality with malaria risk is .67, and with malaria ecology it is .66.  
The log of 1500 population density, however, has a correlation of .38 with malaria risk, but only 
.14 with malaria ecology.  These correlations raise the question of whether AJR instruments reflect 
the historical rather than the modern disease environment, since the latter might have an 
independent affect on human capital, development, and institutions. 
  AJR are well aware of this concern.  As a test, they regress their preferred institutional 
variables on settler mortality and malaria together, and find that settler mortality but not modern 
malaria is statistically significant.  Table 10 presents the results of similar regressions using all   23
available observations (AJR use a subset).  Our results are different from those reported in their 
work.  The impact of settler mortality on today’s institutions remains significant, but so is that of 
malaria risk.  At least part of what settler mortality captures is the modern disease environment.   
These results suggest that the issue of modern disease environment is real, and one should exercise 
caution in treating AJR instruments as proxies for the colonial but not modern mortality risk.   
  Still, both settler mortality and 1500 population density are strongly correlated with today’s 
per capita income. Why might this be so?  This gets us to our third and crucial point. A necessary 
condition for these variables to be valid instruments for institutions is that they not influence per 
capita income through other channels, i.e., be uncorrelated with the error term.   We have seen that 
human capital is an important determinant of economic growth.  The importance of malaria in 
determining current income points in the same direction. Could the influence of AJR’s proposed 
instruments on today’s development work through human capital?   Put differently, perhaps when 
colonizers settled, they brought with them their know-how rather than constraints on the executive.   
  Figures 2-5 show the relationship between settler mortality and 1500 population density on 
the one hand, and total years of schooling in 1960 and 2000 on the other.  These correlations are 
even stronger than those between settler mortality and the measures of institutions.  For example, 
the correlation between settler mortality and years of schooling in 2000 is -.73.   
    Some additional evidence on the importance of human capital, and its relationship to the 
proposed instruments, comes from the small sample of countries for which we have data on 
primary school enrollments in 1900.  Figure 6 shows that this measure of educational investment a 
century ago is a strong predictor of the level of economic development today.    Figures 7 and 8 
further show that this measure of education is strongly negatively correlated with the proposed AJR   24
instruments.  This evidence may further suggest that human capital, both today and as historically 
introduced by the colonizers, drives economic growth.   
Table 11 further investigates the effects of human capital and political institutions in the 
instrumental variables framework.   We present the first and second stage results from the IV 
estimation of the impact of average years of schooling between 1960 and 2000, and average 
executive constraints over the same period, on log GDP per capita in 2000.   As instruments, we 
use French legal origin, log settler mortality, and log 1500 population density (the last two used one 
at a time).   The AJR instruments are important determinants of both executive constraints and 
years of schooling in the first-stage regressions, while French legal origin countries have a lower 
level of constraints on the executive, consistent with La Porta et al. (1999).    In the second-stage 
regression, however, the predicted years of schooling are a statistically significant determinant of 
per capita income, but executive constraints are not.  If anything, in the IV framework human 
capital seems to be a more important  variable predicting development than political institutions.   
We do not wish to push these results too far.  By our own logic, human capital and 
institutions are not the only potentially important baggage that the European colonizers have 
brought with them, and so the instrument might still be correlated with the error term.  They 
brought “guns, germs, and steel” among other things (Diamond 1997, Engerman and Sokoloff 
1991).   The effects of colonial settlement work through many channels, and the instruments used 
in the literature do not tell us which channel matters.  Even if one accepts the view that the 
variables proposed by AJR (2001, 2002) shaped the European settlement patterns, the data do not 
tell us whether the Europeans brought with them their human capital, political institutions, or 
something else.  The instrumental variable approach does not tell us what causes growth.   
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VI.  From Schooling to Institutions  
  As a final way to understand whether schooling or institutional outcomes come first, we 
follow Barro (1997, 1999) and look at timing.  If institutions come first, then lagged values of 
political variables should predict improvements in education.  If education is the critical input, then 
lagged values of education should predict improvement in institutional outcomes.  In the top Panel 
of Table 12, we regress, using five-year intervals, growth in years of schooling on country fixed 
effects, initial schooling, and initial measures of political institutions used in the growth literature 
as well as the initial level of GDP per capita.  The data show some mean reversion in schooling 
(perhaps due to measurement error), a large and positive effect of initial level of income on the 
growth of education, and no effect of initial political institutions, no matter how measured, on the 
growth of human capital.    
In the bottom panel, we look at the changes in political institutions over five-year intervals 
as a function of country fixed effects, initial schooling, initial level of economic development, and 
initial levels of these political institutions themselves.  The results are striking.   Initial levels of 
schooling are a strong predictor of improving institutional outcomes over the next five years using 
3 out of 4 measures, including executive constraints.  Initial per capita income has no predictive 
power.  And, as we saw before, there is a lot of mean reversion in these measures of institutions.   
As before, we do not want to take these results as dispositive.   However, they are strikingly 
consistent with the Lipset view that high human capital leads to institutional improvement, even 
over a relatively short horizon of 5 years.  Moreover, like many of the earlier findings we 
presented, the results are inconsistent with the view that high assessments of political institutions 
predict subsequent improvement in the years of schooling.  
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VII. Conclusion. 
Exploring the causal link between institutions and economic growth has proved extremely 
difficult.   Despite creative and insightful efforts, the existing research strategy does not establish 
this link, due to both conceptual problems with the measurement of institutions and the limitations 
of econometric techniques.   In particular, the existing research  does not show that political 
institutions rather than human capital have a causal effect on economic growth.   Indeed, much 
evidence points to the primacy of human capital for both growth and democratization.    
Our results are consistent with a perspective on institutions outlined by Djankov et al. 
(2003).  According to that paper, each community faces a set of institutional opportunities, 
determined largely by the human and social capital of its population.   The greater the human and 
social capital of a community, the more attractive its institutional opportunities.  Institutions, in this 
framework, are points on this opportunity set, determined by efficiency, history, and politics.   
Institutions are highly persistent because history, including colonial history, shapes social choices.   
But institutional outcomes also get better as the society grows richer, because institutional 
opportunities improve.  Importantly, in that framework, institutions have only a second order effect 
on economic performance.  The first order effect comes from human and social capital, which 
shape both institutional and productive capacities of a society.   
Our results have some implications for economic research and for economic policy.   They 
suggest that research in institutional economics, and in particular on the consequences of alternative 
institutional arrangements,  must focus on actual rules, rather than on conceptually ambiguous 
assessments of institutional outcomes.  The results of this paper do not show that “institutions do 
not matter.”  That proposition is flatly contradicted by a great deal of available empirical evidence, 
including our own.    Rather, our results suggest that the current measurement strategies have   27
conceptual flaws, and that researchers would do better focusing on actual laws, rules, and 
compliance procedures that could be manipulated by a policy maker to assess what works . 
  With respect to policy, our results do not support the view that, from the perspective of 
security of property and economic development, democratization and constraints on government 
must come first.  In many poor countries, such security came from policy choices made by 
dictators.  The economic success of East Asia in the post war era, and of China most recently, has 
been a consequence of good-for-growth dictators, not of institutions constraining them.   Indeed, 
the Chinese example illustrates this point forcefully: there was nothing pre-destined about Deng, 
one of the best dictators for growth, succeeding Mao, one of the worst.   More generally, it might 
be less profitable to look for the “deep” factors explaining economic development than for policies 
favoring human and physical capital accumulation (see also Przeworski 2004a,b).  
  None of this is to deny the merits of democracy and the constraints on government as 
essential human values in their own right.  Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) present 
compelling evidence that in such policy areas as freedom of the press, torture, death penalty, and 
regulation of religion, democracies are significantly more benign than dictatorships.  But our 
evidence suggests some skepticism about the viability of democracy in countries with low level of 
human capital –  there have been few examples of such democracies in the world.   Our evidence 
suggests in contrast that the Lipset-Przeworski-Barro view of the world is more accurate: countries 
that emerge from poverty accumulate human and physical capital under dictatorships, and then, 
once they become richer, are increasingly likely to improve their institutions.   
 
 
   28
Bibliography 
 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. “The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,”  American Economic Review 
91(5): 1369-401. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. “Reversal of Fortune: 
Geography and Development in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4), 1231-1294. 
Alesina, Alberto, Sule Ozler, Nouriel Roubini, and Phillip Swagel. 1996. “Political Instability and 
Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic Growth 1(2): 189-212. 
Alvarez, Michael, José A. Cheibub, Fernando Limongi and Adam Przeworski. 2000. Democracy 
and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Aten, Bettina, Alan Heston and Robert Summers. 2002. Penn World Tables Version 6.1. Center for 
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP). 
Barro, Robert J. 1991 “Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Nations,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 106(2): 407-43. 
Barro, Robert J.  1997. Determinants of Economic Growth.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Barro, Robert J. 1999. “Determinants of Democracy,” Journal of Political Economy 107(6-2): 158-
183. 
Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee. 2000. “International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates 
and Implications” Working Paper 42. Center for International Development (February). 
Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer and Patrick Walsh. 2001. “New Tools 
in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions” World Bank 
Economic Review 15(1): 165-76.  
Center for International Development, Geography Data sets. Found online at: 
<http://www2.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/geographydata.htm#General%20measures%20of%20
geography> 
DeLong, J. Bradford and Andrei Shleifer. 1993. “Princes and Merchants: City Growth before the 
Industrial Revolution.” Journal of Law and Economics 36(2): 671-702. 
Diamond, Jared. 1997. Guns, Germs, and Steel.  New York: Norton.    29
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer. 2003. “The 
New Comparative Economics,” Journal of Comparative Economics 31(4), 595-619. 
Dollar, David and Aart Kraay. 2003. “Institutions, Trade and Growth.” Journal of Monetary 
Economics 50(1): 133-62.   
Easterly, William and Ross Levine. 2003. “Tropics, germs, and crops: how endowments influence 
economic development.” Journal of Monetary Economics 50(1): 3-39. 
Engerman, Stanley, and Kenneth Sokoloff. 1991.  “Factor Endowments, Institutions, and 
Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies,” in Stephen Haber (ed.), How 
Latin America Fell Behind, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.  
Gallup, John L. and Jeffrey D. Sachs. 2001. “The Economic Burden of Malaria.” The Supplement 
to The American Journal of Tropical Medicine & Hygiene, 64(1-2): 85-96.  
Hall, Robert E. and Charles I. Jones. 1999. “Why Do Some Countries Produce so Much More 
Output per Worker than Others?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(1): 83-116. 
International Country Risk Guide. (Political Risk Services, East Syracuse, NY, 1996). 
Jaggers, Keith and Monty G. Marshall, 2000. “Polity IV Project” Center for International 
Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.  
Jones, Benjamin and Benjamin Olken. 2003 “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth 
since World War II.” Monograph, Harvard University.   
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2003. “Governance Matters III: Updated 
Governance Indicators for 1996-02.” Working Paper Draft for comments. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank.  
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón. 2002. “Governance Matters II: Updated 
Governance Indicators for 2000-01” Working Paper No. 2772. World Bank Policy Research 
Department (February).  
Kiszewski, Anthony, Andrew Mellinger, Pia Malaney, Andrew Spielman, Sonia Ehrlich, Jeffrey D. 
Sachs. 2004. “A Global Index of the Stability of Malaria Transmission Based on the 
Intrinsic Properties of Anopheline Mosquito Vectors.” American Journal of Tropical 
Medicine and Hygiene. Forthcoming. 
Knack, Steven and Philip Keefer. 1995. “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country 
Tests Using Alternative Measures.” Economics and Politics 7(3): 207-27.   30
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1997. “Legal 
Determinants of External Finance,” Journal of Finance 52(3), 1131-1150. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1998. “Law and 
Finance,” Journal of Political Economy 106(6), 1113-1155.  
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1999. “The 
Quality of Government,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15(1) 222-79. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Christian Pop-Eleches and Andrei Shleifer. 2004. 
“Judicial Checks and Balances.” Journal of Political Economy 112(2), 445-470. 
Lindert, Peter H. 2001. “Democracy, Decentralization, and Mass Schooling before 1914” working 
paper 104. San Diego, California: University of California Agricultural History Center 
(February). 
Lipset, Seymour M. 1960. Political Man: The Social Basis of Modern Politics. New York: 
Doubleday. 
Lucas, Robert E. 1988. “On the Mechanics of Economic Development.” Journal of Monetary 
Economics 22(1): 3-42. 
Maddison, Angus. 2003. The World Economy: Historical Statistics.  Paris: OECD.  
Mauro, Paolo, 1995, "Corruption and Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110:  
681-712.  
McEvedy, Colin and Richard Jones. 1978. Atlas of World Population History. Viking Press.  
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat. 1748. The Spirit of the Laws. Paris. 
Mulligan, Casey, Ricard Gil, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 2004. “Do Democracies Have Different 
Public Policies than Nondemocracies?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 18(1): 51-74. 
North, Douglass C.  1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton & Co. 
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
North, Douglass C. and Robert P. Thomas. 1973. The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic 
History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2003. The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press. 
Pritchett, Lant. 2000.  “Where has all the education gone?” World Bank Economic Review 15(3).   31
Przeworski, Adam. 2004a. “The Last Instance: Are Institutions the Primary Cause of Economic 
Development?”  Mimeo, New York University.  
Przerworski, Adam.  2004b. “Georgraphy vs Institutions Revisited: Were Fortuntes Reversed?”.  
Mimeo, New York University. 
Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi, 2002. “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of 
Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development.” NBER Working 
Paper 9305, National Bureau of Economic Research (October). 
Smith, Adam. 1976 [1776]. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, edited 
by Edwin Canaan. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. 
World Health Organization. 1997. “World Malaria Situation in 1994, Part I,” WHO Weekly 
Epidemiological Record 36: 269-74. 
 
 





Autocracy           
(1960-2000)
Autocracy          
(1960-1990)
Years of schooling 
(1960-2000)
18.53% 17.52% 19.36% 18.86% 10.33%
Table 1 
Volatility of political institutions and human capital
Average within-country standard deviation
Polity IV
The table shows the average within-country standard deviation of various measures of political institutions and human capital.
Due to data availability, we measure human capital (years of schooling) and the Polity IV variables of political institutions in
1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000. We measure the autocracy variable from Alvarez et al. (2000) for
1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 only because their data ends at that point. All variables were normalized to











Years of schooling (1960) 1.1773
a
(0.0885)
Executive constraints (1960) 0.2719
b
(0.1246)






Observations 50 50 50 50
R
2
0.73 0.09 0.07 0.10
a=significant at 1 percent; b=significant at 5 percent; c=significant at 10 percent.
Persistence of political institutions and human capital
Table 2
Dependent variables:
The table shows OLS regressions for the cross-section of countries. The specifications include a constant but
we do not report the estimates in the table. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. All variables are






















Executive constraints (1960-2000) 0.7119
a
Expropriation risk (1982-1997) 0.7906
a 0.6378
a


























b -0.1684 0.1284 -0.6118
a
a=significant at 1 percent; b=significant at 5 percent; c=significant at 10 percent.
Table 3









(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0036)









(0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0026)









(0.0049) (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0055) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0052)
Executive constraints (1960-2000) 0.0021
b
(0.0008)
Expropriation risk (1982-1997) 0.0040
a
(0.0014)
Autocracy -- Alvarez (1960-1990) -0.0060
c
(0.0032)
Government effectiveness (1998-2000) 0.0075
a
(0.0024)
Judicial independence (1995) -0.0041
(0.0057)




Proportional representation (1975-2000) 0.0019
(0.0031)
Observations 71 69 71 71 54 54 71 70
R
2 0.44 0.56 0.44 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.41 0.44
a=significant at 1 percent; b=significant at 5 percent; c=significant at 10 percent.
Table 4
Dependent variable is growth of GDP per capita 1960-2000
Economic growth, political institutions and human capital
The table shows OLS regressions for the cross-section of countries. The dependent variable in all specifications is the growth of GDP per capita for the period 1960-
2000. The specifications include a constant but we do not report the estimates in the table. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. All variables are defined






(0.0076) (0.0070) (0.0084) (0.0073) (0.0039)
Log initial GDP per capita -0.0059 -0.0032 -0.0079
b 0.0021 -0.0079
a
(0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0025)
Initial executive constraints 0.0008 -0.0004 0.0027
b 0.0006 0.0013
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0009)
Observations 77 99 102 95 72
R
2
17% 6% 19% 6% 34%







(0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0082) (0.0073) (0.0049)




(0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0034)






(0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0024)
Observations 79 86 90 82 71
R
2 22% 24% 16% 9% 38%







(0.0085) (0.0070) (0.0082) (0.0077) (0.0048)





(0.0048) (0.0057) (0.0045) (0.0055) (0.0034)
Initial executive constraints -0.0004 -0.0017 0.0031
b 0.0014 0.0008
(0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0008)






(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0028)
Observations 61 80 86 81 57
R
2 33% 20% 20% 9% 55%
a=significant at 1 percent; b=significant at 5 percent; c=significant at 10 percent.
Share of population living in 
temperate zone (1995)
Panel B: Dependent variables are the growth rates of GDP per capita for each decade between 1960 and 2000 and for the whole period
Panel C: Dependent variables are the growth rates of GDP per capita for each decade between 1960 and 2000 and for the whole period
Table 5
Panel A: Dependent variables are the growth rates of GDP per capita for each decade between 1960 and 2000 and for the whole period
Economic growth, initial constraints on the executive and initial human capital
The table shows OLS regressions for the cross-section of countries. The dependent variables are the growth rates of GDP per capita for each decade between 1960 and 2000 and for the whole period. The
specifications include a constant but we do not report the estimates in the table. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Share of population living in 
temperate zone (1995)
Share of population living in 
temperate zone (1995)1870-1950 1890-1950 1900-1950
Log initial GDP per capita 0.0027 0.0050
b -0.0019
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0038)
Initial executive constraints -0.0001 0.0002 0.0006
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Observations 29 27 31
R
2 0.06 0.26 0.02
1870-1950 1890-1950 1900-1950
Log initial GDP per capita -0.0076
a -0.0028 -0.0011
(0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0037)
Initial executive constraints -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Primary school enrollment 1870 0.0206
a
(0.0030)
Primary school enrollment 1890 0.0127
b
(0.0056)
Primary school enrollment 1900 0.0067
(0.0066)
Observations 16 23 27
R
2 0.73 0.21 0.08
a=significant at 1 percent; b=significant at 5 percent; c=significant at 10 percent.
Panel B: Dependent variables are the growth rates of GDP per capita for each period
Panel A: Dependent variables are the growth rates of GDP per capita for each period
Long-term economic growth, initial executive constraints and initial human capital
Table 6
The table shows OLS regressions for the cross-section of countries. The dependent variables are the growth rates of GDP per capita for each period. The
specifications include a constant but we do not report the estimates in the table. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. All variables are defined in
Appendix 1. Years of schooling (1960) Democracy = 10 10 > Democracy > 7 7 ≥ Democracy > 2 Democracy ≤ 2 All countries
Low (yrs. schooling < 2.6785) 0 6 8 28 42
Intermediate (2.6785 ≤ yrs. schooling ≤ 5.0115) 2 5 14 3 24
High (yrs. schooling >5.0115) 17 3 3 0 23
Total 19 14 25 31 89
Table 7
Note: The two stable democracies with intermediate schooling levels are Italy and Costa Rica. The three authoritarian countries with intermediate schooling levels are Singapore, Taiwan and Paraguay. 
Political regimes and human capital
Distribution of countries by years of schooling in 1960 and political regimes. The classification of political regimes is based on the average democracy score for 1960-
2000 from the Polity IV database. We divide the sample of countries into those with low human capital (years of schooling below the sample's median value of 2.6785),
intermediate human capital (years of schooling between 2.6785 and 5.0115), and high human capital (years schooling above the sample's 75
th percentile value of 5.0115
years).  The table shows the number of countries that fall within each group.  All variables are defined in Appendix 1.Years of schooling (1960) Democracy = 10 10 > Democracy > 7 7 ≥ Democracy > 2 Democracy ≤ 2 All countries
Low (yrs. schooling < 2.6785) 6 17 22 87 132
Intermediate (2.6785 ≤ yrs. schooling ≤ 5.0115) 9 21 26 35 91
High (yrs. schooling > 5.0115) 67 10 3 7 87
Total 82 48 51 129 310
Low (yrs. schooling < 2.6785) 0.0036 0.0292 0.0185 0.0076 0.0120
Intermediate (2.6785 ≤ yrs. schooling ≤ 5.0115) 0.0225 0.0224 0.0271 0.0273 0.0256
High (yrs. schooling > 5.0115) 0.0257 0.0212 0.0235 0.0204 0.0247
Total 0.0238 0.0246 0.0232 0.0136 0.0196
Low (yrs. schooling < 2.6785) 0.0168 0.0298 0.0224 0.0303 0.0294
Intermediate (2.6785 ≤ yrs. schooling ≤ 5.0115) 0.0161 0.0197 0.0206 0.0317 0.0247
High (yrs. schooling > 5.0115) 0.0137 0.0122 0.0078 0.0250 0.0144
Total 0.0151 0.0225 0.0210 0.0315 0.0254
Panel C: Mean standard deviation of the 10-year growth rates across countries
Table 8
Growth rates and political regimes
The table is based on the sample of countries described in Table 7. The table shows the number of observations for each group of countries, the average
within-country 10-year GDP per capita growth rates and the mean standard deviation of the 10-year GDP per capita growth rates across countries. The
democracy score is computed at the beginning of each decade using the preceding ten years of data. We measure growth at the beginnig of each decade
using the subsequent ten years. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
Panel B: Average within-country 10-year growth rate
Panel A: Number of observationsLow Intermediate
(yrs. schooling < 2.6785) (2.6785 ≤ yrs. schooling ≤ 5.0115)
Percentage of years  Percentage of years 
Length of leader < 2 years
  Autocratic regime 1.62% 1.90%
  Democratic regime 0.52% 2.45%
Length of leader ≥  2 years but < 5 years
  Autocratic regime 10.93% 10.28%
  Democratic regime 5.25% 18.30%
Length of leader ≥  5 years but < 10 years
  Autocratic regime 16.32% 11.83%
  Democratic regime 7.32% 14.32%
Length of leader ≥  10 years
  Autocratic regime 49.80% 32.33%
  Democratic regime 6.15% 8.58%
Table 9
Percentage of years spent under different political regimes
The table presents the mean percentage of years that countries spent under autocratic or democratic regimes from 1960 to 1990.
The sample only includes countries with years of schooling in 1960 below 5.0115 (low and intermediate levels of human capital).
The classification into autocracy and democracy comes from the data in Alvarez et al. (2000). For each type of political regime, we













(0.1965) (0.1764) (0.0507) (0.0918)





(0.5504) (0.3731) (0.1597) (0.2133)
Observations 74 66 74 77
R
2 0.36 0.32 0.29 0.43
a=significant at 1 percent; b=significant at 5 percent; c=significant at 10 percent.
Table 10
The table shows OLS regressions for the cross-section of countries. The specifications include a constant but we do not report the estimates in the table. Robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses. All definitions are in Appendix 1.
















(0.7202) (0.8044) (0.8359) (0.8933)








French legal origin -1.4124
a -0.3770 -1.1988
b -0.5329
(0.4258) (0.4757) (0.4538) (0.4850)
Observations 47 47 55 55
R
2 0.53 0.70 0.25 0.55
F-Test for excluded instruments
a=significant at the 1 percent; b=significant at the 5 percent; c=significant at 10 percent.
Correlation of predicted values of executive 









Panel B: First-stage regressions
Dependent variables:













Share of population living in temperate zone 
(1995)
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2000
(1) (2)
Table 11
 Economic development, instrumental variable regressions
The table shows instrumental variables regressions for the cross-section of countries. Panel A reports the second-stage estimates from instrumental variables
regressions with first-stage estimates shown in Panel B. The dependent variable in both second-stage specifications is the log of GDP per capita in 2000. Panel B
reports the first-stage estimates for two sets of instruments. The first specification instruments executive constraints and years of schooling using the log of settler
mortality and French legal origin. The second specification instruments executive constraints and years of schooling using the log of population density in 1500
and French legal origin. The specifications in both stages include a constant but we do not report the estimates in the table. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.




(0.0237) (0.0339) (0.0250) (0.0239)





(0.0790) (0.1055) (0.0797) (0.0793)
Executive constraints (t) -0.0099
(0.0118)
Autocracy -- Polity IV (t)  0.0373
(0.0391)




Observations 514 420 514 514
R
2 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.24
Change executive 
constraints
Change autocracy  --
Polity IV








(0.1191) (0.1790) (0.0707) (0.1804)
Log GDP per capita (t) 0.0382 0.5075 -0.2675 0.2918
(0.4035) (0.6295) (0.2022) (0.6055)
Executive constraints (t) -0.5724
a
(0.0716)
Autocracy -- Polity IV (t)  -0.5471
a
(0.0680)






Observations 499 499 349 499
R
2
0.33 0.32 0.47 0.30
a=significant at 1 percent; b=significant at 5 percent; c=significant at 10 percent.
Table 12
Panel A: Dependent variable is the 5-year change in years of schooling (t+5,t)
Panel B: Dependent variables are the 5-year changes in political institutions (t+5,t)
The table shows OLS regressions with country fixed effects for the cross-section of countries. The specifications include a
constant and country fixed effects but we do not report the estimates in the table. Errors are clustered at the country level and
reported in parentheses. All definitions are in Appendix 1.Figure 1:  Executive Constraints 1948-2001 
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-2 0 2 4
Demeaned Log Settler mortality
coef = -1.3837569, (robust) se = .26166601, t = -5.29
 Figure 3 




























































































-4 -2 0 2 4
Demeaned Log population density in 1500
coef = -.92672729, (robust) se = .15640188, t = -5.93
 
 Figure 4 































































































-2 0 2 4
Demeaned Log settler mortality
coef = -1.727679, (robust) se = .20195631, t = -8.55
 Figure 5 





































































































-4 -2 0 2 4
Demeaned Log population density in 1500
coef = -.98564063, (robust) se = .1677801, t = -5.87
 
 Figure 6 









































































Demeaned Primary school enrollment (1900)
coef = 2.141442, (robust) se = .25222243, t = 8.49
 Figure 7 














































































-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
Demeaned Log settler mortality
coef = -.30105869, (robust) se = .05789886, t = -5.2
 Figure 8 

















































































-4 -2 0 2 4 6
Demeaned Log population density in 1500
coef = -.0866499, (robust) se = .0224173, t = -3.87
 Variable                                                             Definition
Executive constraints A measure of the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives. The variable takes
seven different values: (1) Unlimited authority (there are no regular limitations on the executive's actions, as distinct from
irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations); (2) Intermediate category; (3) Slight to moderate
limitation on executive authority (there are some real but limited restraints on the executive); (4) Intermediate category; (5)
Substantial limitations on executive authority (the executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is
subject to substantial constraints by them); (6) Intermediate category;(7) Executive parity or subordination (accountabilitygroups
have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity). This variable ranges from one to seven
where higher values equal a greater extent of institutionalized constraints on the power of chief executives. This variable is
calculated as the average from 1960 through 2000, or for specific years as needed in the tables. Source: Jaggers and Marshall (200
Democracy A measure of the degree of democracy in a given country based on: (1) the competitiveness of political participation; (2) the
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment; and (3) the constraints on the chief executive. The variable ranges from
zero to ten, where higher values equal a higher degree of institutionalized democracy. This variable is calculated as the average
from 1960 through 2000, or for specific years as needed in the tables. Source:  Jaggers and Marshall (2000).
Autocracy -- Polity IV A measure of the degree of autocracy in a given country based on: (1) the competitiveness of political participation; (2) the
regulation of political participation; (3) the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment; and (4) constraints on the
chief executive. This variable ranges from zero to ten where higher values equal a higher degree of institutionalized autocracy.
This variable is calculated as the average from 1960 through 2000, or for specific years as needed in the tables. Source: Jaggers
and Marshall (2000).
Expropriation risk  Risk of “outright confiscation and forced nationalization" of property. This variable ranges from zero to ten where higher values 
are equals a lower probability of expropriation. This variable is calculated as the average from 1982 through 1997, or for specific 
years as needed in the tables. Source: International Country Risk Guide at http://www.countrydata.com/datasets/.
Autocracy -- Alvarez This variable classifies regimes based on their degree of autocracy. Democracies are coded as 0, bureaucracies (dictatorships with
a legislature) are coded as 1 and autocracies (dictatorship without a legislature) are coded as 2. Transition years are coded as the
regime that emerges afterwards. This variable ranges from zero to two where higher values equal a higher degree of autocracy.
This variable is measured as the average from 1960 through 1990; or for specific years as needed in the tables. Source: Alvarezet
al. (2000). 
Government effectiveness This variable measures the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants,
the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies.
The main focus of this index is on “inputs” required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and
deliver public goods. This variable ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 where higher values equal higher government effectiveness. This
variable is measured as the average from 1998 through 2000. Source: Kaufman et al. (2003).
Judicial independence Judicial independence is computed as the sum of three variables. The first measures the tenure of Supreme Court judges (highest
court in any country) and takes a value of 2 - if tenure is lifelong, 1 - if tenure is more than six years but not lifelong, and 0 - if
tenure is less than six years. The second measures the tenure of the highest ranked judges ruling on administrative cases and
takes a value of 2 - if tenure is lifelong,1 - if tenure is more than six years but not lifelong,0 – if tenure is less than six years. The
third measures the existence of case law and takes a value of 1 if judicial decisions in a given country are a source of law, and 0
otherwise. The variable is normalized from zero to one where higher values equal a higher degree of judicial independence. This
variable is measured as of 1995. Source: La Porta et al. (2004).
Constitutional review Constitutional review is computed as the sum of two variables. The first variable measures the extent to which judges (either
Supreme Court or constitutional court) have the power to review the constitutionality of laws in a given country. The variable
takes three values: 2- if there is full review of constitutionalityof laws, 1 - if there is limited review of constitutionalityof laws, 0 -
if there is no review of constitutionalityof laws. The second variable measures (on a scale from 1 to 4) how hard it is to change
the constitution in a given country. One point each is given if the approval of the majority of the legislature, the chief of state and
a referendum is necessary in order to change the constitution. An additional point is given for each of the following: if a
supermajority in the legislature (more than 66% of votes) is needed, if both houses of the legislature have to approve, if the
legislature has to approve the amendment in two consecutive legislative terms or if the approval of a majority
of state legislature is required. This variable is normalized from zero to one where higher values equal a higher degree of
constitutional review by the courts. This variable is measured as of 1995. Source: La Porta et al. (2004).
Plurality This variable is equal to one for each year in which legislators were elected using a winner-take-all / first past the post rule; it
equals zero otherwise. This variable is measured as the average from 1975 through 2000. Source: Beck et al. (2001).
Proportional representation This variable is equal to one for each year in which candidates were elected using a proportional representation system; equals
zero otherwise. Proportional representation means that candidates are elected based on the percentage of votes received by their
party. This variable is measured as the average from 1975 through 2000. Source: Beck et al. (2001).
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions
Measures of institutionsVariable                                                             Definition
Share of population living in 
temperate zone
Percentage of a country's population in Koeppen-Geiger temperate zone in 1995.  Source: Center for International Development, 
Geography Data Sets. Found online at: 
http://www2.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/geographydata.htm#General%20measures%20of%20geography.
Log settler mortality Log of the mortality rate faced by European settlers at the time of colonization.  Source: Acemoglu, et al. (2001).
Population density in 1500 Total population divided by total arable land in 1500 A.D. Source: McEvedy and Jones (1978) as cited in Acemoglu, et al.
(2002).
Population at risk of malaria Percentage of the population at risk of malaria transmission in 1994. Source: World Health Organization (1997). 
Malaria ecology Malaria Ecology,pop-weighted, Sept 2003 version. This variable provides an instrument for malaria risk that controls for the fact
that causation may run not only from malaria to income but also from income to malaria. The basic formula for ME includes
temperature, species abundance, and vector type (the type of mosquito). The underlying index is measured on a highly
disaggregated sub-national level, and then is averaged for the entire country. Because ME is built upon climatologicaland vector
conditions on a country-by-country basis, it is exogenous to public health interventions and economic conditions. Source:
Kiszewski et al. (2004). 
Years of schooling Years of schooling of the total population aged over 25. This variable is constructed as the average from 1960 through 2000; or 
for specific years as needed in the tables. Source:  Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee, International Data on Educational 
Attainment: Updates and Implications. Source: Barro and Lee (2000)  Data posted on 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
Primary school enrollment This variable measures primary school enrollment as a percentage of children aged 5 through 14. Measured in 1870, 1890, and
1900.   Source: Lindert (2001). 
Legal origin Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country (English, French, Socialist, German,
Scandinavian). Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
GDP per capita Gross domestic product over population. Source: Aten et al. (2002). Data available on-line at: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ (this
paper uses data from the 04-06-2003 version). GDP per capita for the 1870-1950 period comes from Maddison (2003). 
Other variables